COMMENTS
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT

A

PROBLEM of major importance in securities regulation has recently
come before the federal courts as a large number of plaintiffs assert the
existence of private rights of action under the Investment Company
Act of i94o.1 Since the statute itself is generally silent as to private
rights of action, these plaintiffs contend that private actions can be supported by implication.
The Investment Company Act closely regulates the relations between the investment company and its officers, directors, underwriters,
and investment advisers. In a number of cases now pending, directors
and investment advisers of mutual funds are charged with abuse of their
fiduciary positions and with mismanagement and waste of the funds'
assets on account of the payment of allegedly excessive investment
advisory fees. 2 Some of the substantive issues in these cases could prob"54 Stat. 789 (194o), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8oa-i-8oa-5z (1958).
' Most funds pay an advisory fee of Y of i% of the fund's net assets each year,
although a few funds have sliding scales for compensation of the investment advisor,
with decreasing percentages applied to successive increments of the fund. See Mutual
Funds Fight Holder Suits Charging Excessive Fees to Management Concerns, The
Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3, 196o, p. 28, cols. 2-3. There seems to emerge a general
pattern of allegations in complaints in these excessive advisory fee cases, all employed to
show that the advisory fee is unreasonable and set collusively in the interest of the
adviser and not the fund. They may be briefly listed as follows:
i. Directors of the adviser who are also directors of the fund dominate and control
the fund so that these 'affiliated directors' are able to fix the advisory fee in the interest
of the adviser and not the fund.
2. The advisory fee charged bears no relation to the reasonable value of the services
rendered. Other funds gets the same advice for less.
3. The flat Y2 of i%

fee, even if scaled down after $oo

or $2o

million, is un-

reasonable per se in that the cost of investment management does not increase in
proportion to the increase in a fund's net asset value.
4. Where a series of funds is involved the adviser exacts the same Y2 of i % from each
fund despite the fact that his costs are significantly lower due to the great duplication of securities contained in the portfolios of these funds.
5. Fund directors have sought to increase the fund's net asset value by merger, acquisition, or aggressive sales techniques even though such growth would harm the fund. The

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. x961 : 471

ably be raised under state statutes or common law. But the problems
which these cases present can receive a more uniform solution if they are
treated as problems of federal law under the Investment Company Act.
This Act offers appropriate standards for gaging fiduciary conduct and
the federal judiciary has had considerable experience in applying such
standards to securities regulation.3 The present question then is a procedural one: may these plaintiffs come into federal court other than by
diversity jurisdiction? This question was squarely presented to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Brouk v. Maaged
Funds, Tnc.4
BROUK V. MANAGED FUNDS

Managed Funds, Incoroprated, is an open end investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act, having net assets
reason for such policies is the great benefit which will accrue to the investment adviser

whose fee is tied to the fund's net asset value.
6. Though a management has produced poor results, the advisory contract is nevertheless consistently renewed, a demonstration of the failure of the fund's board to seek
the best advice at the lowest price, all of which is due to the domination and interests
of the directors affiliated with both the investment adviser and the fund.
7.In many cases the directors of the fund have appropriated the investment advice to
their own use or allowed that information to be used in the management of other port-

folios.
Thus, in an "excessive fee" suit the plaintiff's case turns on the allegation that the
fees paid by the fund to its investment adviser, pursuant to their investment advisory
contract, are unreasonable and excessive and constitute an illegal waste of the fund's
assets.
The first of the "excessive fee" suits to be decided on the merits upheld the schedule
of fees paid by Chemical Fund to its manager and distributor, F. Eberstadt & Co. The
Chancery Court of Delaware dismissed the complaint, observing that plaintiffs had not
proved the advisory fees to be excessive. This decision, however, does not necessarily
indicate the probable decision of other suits pending, because Chemical Fund is among
the small number of mutual funds having sliding fee scales. Eberstadt receives Y. of
i% on the first $75 million of the fund's assets, Y/ of x% on the following $50 million,
and Y4 of i% on all additional assets.

In

196o,

Eberstadt received $894,191 in man-

agement fees, Chemical Fund having about $302 million in assets.
Under pressure of a stockholder's suit, Lazard Fund recently reduced the fee of its
adviser, Lazard Freres & Company, on assets in excess of $xoo million. Another fund
which has recently switched to the sliding scale fee basis is State Street Investment

Corp.
See Fund Wins Skirmish Over Management Fees, Business Week (May 13, 1961)
p. 1175 U.S. News & World Report (March 13, 196i) p. 112.
'Another important advantage gained by bringing these cases under the Investment
Company Act is the availability of nationwide service of process under § 43 of the act.
4 286 F.zd 9oi (8th Cir. 1961),
cert. granted, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3378 (U.S. June

19, 1961) (No. 947).
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of about seventy million dollars.' In July of 1959, the Securities and
Exchange Commission issued a stop order against Managed Funds,'
under section 8(d) of the Securities Act of 1933. This order prevented
further sale of shares in the Fund and, indirectly, precipitated the ouster
of the directors, officers, and affiliated persons who formerly controlled
Managed Funds. Subsequently, civil actions were brought to recover
damages from this former controlling group and to enjoin the perpetration of certain practices they had instituted.
Emanuel Josephson brought a stockholder's derivative action on
behalf of Managed Funds, Inc., in the United States District Court in
Delaware, and Managed Funds itself brought a direct action in the
Eastern District of Missouri. Josephson's suit was transferred to
Missouri and consolidated with the Managed Funds case. Allegations
in the two complaints were based principally on the findings of the SEC
in the stop order proceeding. Several persons were implicated in that
investigation. Hilton and Hovey Slayton (referred to as the individual
Slaytons) were the principal officers and dominant directors of Managed Funds, Inc. The individual Slaytons owned or controlled: (i)
Slayton Associates, which had an investment advisory contract with
Managed Funds, Inc., (2) Slayton & Co., which sold Managed Funds
shares to the public through its own sales organization, and (3) Mutual
Funds Distributors, Inc., which distributed Managed Funds shares
through brokers and dealers. Stephen Jaquith, a member of the stock
brokerage firm of Model, Roland & Stone, was retained by Slayton
Associates under a contract which was found by the SEC to delegate
the investment advisory function to him.' Jaquith's compensation
under this contract consisted of brokerage commissions on the securities
transactions of Managed Funds. The Commission found that Jaquith
was required to share these commissions with two individuals close to
the Slaytons, a relative and a former business associate. Over a five
'This was the approximate size of the company at the end of 1958.
'In the matter of Managed Funds, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 422, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. I 76,662 (July 30, 1959).
" An additional party plaintiff is Protective Casualty Insurance Company, which
was allowed to intervene and adopt the Josephson complaint. There are thirty parties
defendant in the consolidated case, including the investment adviser, the underwriting
companies, various oicers and directors of these companies and of Managed Funds,
and a stock brokerage firm.
' Jaquith's contract purported to delegate to him greater powers over the Managed
Funds portfolio than was given to Slayton Associates by its contract with Managed
Funds.
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year period, about two million dollars in brokerage commissions were
directed to Model, Roland & Stone on account of Jaquith and the
parties who shared these commissions with him. During that same
period, Slayton Associates, Inc., received over one million dollars for
investment advisory services, and the individual Slaytons received large
salaries from Managed Funds.
The Commission found that the board of directors of Managed
Funds "gave scant attention to the management of the registrant;
made no efforts to be informed concerning registrant's policies and
whether such policies were being followed; made no decisions concerning purchases and sales of portfolio securities [although the contrary
was represented in the prospectus]; and generally permitted the
registrant to be managed by the Slaytons without consultation with or
approval by the board as a whole." 9 The Commission further found
that Jaquith was an investment adviser under section 15 of the Investment Company Act and that his contract had never been approved by
the shareholders or directors of Managed Funds, as the Act requires ;"
that brokerage commissions on the securities transactions of Managed
Funds were directed to Jaquith in payment for advisory services which
Slayton Associates was obligated to perform and for which it was paid;
that such brokerage commissions were also directed to a relative and
to a former business associate of the Slaytons; that brokerage commissions were directed to the broker-dealers who sold Managed Funds
shares, under a reciprocal business arrangement on which the prospectus
was silent. The Commission also found that, although Managed Funds
represented its primary objective as capital growth, the company followed instead a policy of providing high and uniform quarterly dividends in order to promote sales of its shares and so increase sales
commissions and management fees received by the Slayton companies,
and in order to gain the nine per cent sales load-" on reinvestments of
the distributed moneys (since many shareholders did reinvest customarily); that portfolio management was much impaired by this dividend policy; that securities frequently had to be sold to generate
9CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. I 76,66z at p. 80,509.
Jaquith's contract violated the standards of § 15 of the act for an advisory con-

10

tract in that it did not give a satisfactory description of his total compensation: the

contract specified only the minimum level of compensation and said nothing about the
maximum.
" The sales load is the mark-up over net asset value. The fund itself receives net
asset value for its shares, while the broker, distributor, and/or underwriter receive the

sales load.
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capital gains for distributions already authorized by the board of directors; that many poor investments were retained merely to avoid
realization of capital losses, which would affect the distributable capital
gains; that securities were sometimes bought back at higher prices after
they had been sold to realize a distributable gain; that portfolio turnover was extremely and uncommonly high for an investment company,
the turnover generating desired brokerage commissions for Jaquith and
his associates. 2
These findings of the Commission were generally adopted and
alleged as facts in both the Josephson and Managed Funds complaints.' 3
12

Findings of the Commission are set forth in detail in In the mnatter of Managed

Funds, Inc., Securities Act Release No.

4122, CCH FED. SEC. REP.
76,662 (July 30,
1959).
" The principal allegations in these complaints are as follows, quoting and paraphrasing from the Brouk opinion, z86 F.zd at 903-04:
Managed Funds' Complaint
Count i: Alleges the facts set forth in the SEC's stop order opinion; further avers that
the defendants committed violations of the Investment Company Act by:
(a) operating the Fund in the interest of directors, etc.; rather than the Fund's security
holders,
(b) causing the Fund to publish and circulate documents containing untrue statements
or omitting material facts,
(c) causing the Fund to deviate from a fundamental investment policy.
Count one further alleges that defendants Model, Roland & Stone and Jacquith acted
as investment advisers without a written contract approved by the outstanding voting
securities of the Fund.
Count 2: Avers that the Fund may be liable to purchasers of its shares by reason of the
defendants' having caused the Fund to file a false registration statement under the
Securities Act of 19335 that the Fund's name and good will were damaged and that
the Fund incurred counsel fees and other expenses in connection with stop order proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Count 3: Avers that the individual Slaytons, as President and Vice-President of Managed Funds, occupied a fiduciary relationship with the Fund; that Model, Roland &
Stone and Jacquith acted as investment advisers and therefore occupied a fiduciary relationship; that all the other defendants had knowledge, actual or constructive, of these
fiduciary relationships; that Slaytons and Model, Roland & Stone committed waste and
mismanaged the Fund, and that all except the outside directors profited thereby; that
all other defendants, by reason of their alleged knowledge of the fiduciary relationships
of the Slaytons and Model, Roland & Stone are liable for their acts.
Count 4: Avers a conspiracy among defendants.
Each of the counts prays for money damages and an accounting for profits from each
of the defendants.
The Josephson complaint recites the same basic facts as Count i of the Fund's
amended complaint, and avers also that "the wrongful acts herein described have been
and continue to be committed by the defendants against Managed Funds in breach of
legal and fiduciary obligations that are inherent by reason of the relationship of the
parties." Id. at 904. Josephson prays for an injunction in addition to an accounting
and damages.
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In addition, the complaints alleged that: "The defendants committed,
or with actual or constructive knowledge as herein above set forth, aided,
abetted, acquiesced in or condoned, directly or indirectly, violations of
the Investment Company Act of 194o."' 4
Certain of the defendants, outside directors who were in effect
"dummy" directors, moved to dismiss the complaints as to them for
lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter."' The district court denied
these motions, but determined that they presented "a controlling question of law upon which there is a substantial ground for difference of
opinion,"'" whereupon immediate appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit was allowed." The Court of Appeals reversed. In
holding that the complaint did not support the federal jurisdiction, the
court noted:"s
At common law directors are liable to exercise due care and are not insurers. .

.

.

The complaints here substantially seek to hold these former

directors to strict liability as insurers. The Act they rely on not only contains
no such provision but plainly negates any intent to create such an innovation.
The reliance upon implication to support the jurisdiction is not justified in
the face of the legislative intent to exclude it.
A petition for rehearing, in support of which the SEC filed a brief
amicus, was denied.'
BROWN v. BULLOCK

About two months after the Eighth Circuit decided Brouk, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
ruled differently in a similar procedural situation presented by Brown v.
Bullock."0 Again, the problem of construing the Investment Company
Act with regard to private rights of action was raised by a motion to
dismiss the complaint.
The mutual fund involved, Dividend Shares, Incorporated, is a
"Paragraph

2I, count s, Managed Funds' amended complaint, as quoted by the

court at 286 F.zd 9oi, 9o3.

"Also, two defendants sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of their persons.
They had been served with process in another state, presumably under the provision
of the Investment Company Act allowing nationwide service of process, 54 Stat. 844
(-940), .5 U.S.C. § 8oa-43 (958).
18 z86 F.2d at 902.
"'

T

his appeal was allowed under 28 U.S.C. § i2 9 z(b) (1958).

1s 286 F.zd at 918.

"Rehearing denied on March 6, 196x. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari.
See note 4 supra.
"9CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 191,013 (S.D.N.Y. March 9, 1961).
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diversified open end investment company, registered under the Investment Company Act and having net assets of about 255 million dollars.2 '
Calvin Bullock, Limited, is investment adviser to Dividend Shares and
also the chief underwriter and sole distributor of its shares. Plaintiffs,
shareholders of Dividend Shares, brought suit "derivatively on behalf
of the Fund and representatively on behalf of themselves and all other
shareholders of the Fund similarly situated."" The Fund and its
management company, Calvin Bullock, Limited, were named as corporate defendants. The nine individual defendants are directors of the
Fund and the Management Company. Among them are Hugh Bullock, president and a director of both the Fund and the Management
Company, and Robert Clark, executive vice-president of the Management Company and a director of both the Fund and the Management
Company.
Although the complaint stated but one count, the court grouped the
allegations as follows:" (i) Complete domination and control of Dividend Shares by the defendant Management Company and defendants
Bullock and Clarki (2) wrongful transactions concerning the investment advisory contract and its yearly extensions5 and (3) wrongful
transactions concerning the underwriting contract and its yearly extensions.
For the five fiscal years preceding 1959 the Management Company
received about four million dollars in investment advisory fees and
realized some two million dollars on sales of the Fund's shares. The
advisory fees were alleged to be not only excessive but also discriminatory in that the Management Company furnished generally similar
services to other investment companies for a lesser compensation, both
absolutely and proportionately to the size of the investment companies
involved. 4 The complaint further alleged that the making of excessive
advisory payments and the receipt thereof by the Management Company constituted an "unlawful and willful" conversion of the Fund's
assets by the defendants, as well as gross abuse of trust, gross misconduct, waste and spoliation of the Fund's assets.25
"' This was the approximate size of the fund in April, 196o.
2' CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,013 at p. 93,355, where the court is quoting from
paragraph 2(b) of the complaint.
23 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,013 at pp. 93,355-59.

There is also a group of

"procedural" allegations, necessary as a matter of form for derivative and representative
actions.
24
1 . at p. 93,357.
11

Ibid.
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The gravamen of the complaint, therefore, is excessive fees and
breaches of fidudary duty. But there are other allegations:"
that the defendants knew the compensation to be excessive; that the so-called
independent directors were beholden to Bullock and Clark for lucrative positions; that they were dominated and controlled by Bullock and Clark; that
the Fund's personnel, business, affairs, management and operations were
completely dominated and controlled by Bullock, Clark and the Management
Company; that the board of directors of the Fund had abdicated their functions in favor of Bullock, Clark, and the Management Company; that the
Fund's contracts with the Management Company were the result of collusion
between the Fund's directors and the Management Company and designed
for the benefit of the fiduciary (the Management Company) to the detriment
of the Fund; that the Fund's directors abdicated their statutory duty to use
their judgment in approving the annual extensions of the investment advisory
and underwriting contracts; that false and misleading proxy statements
transmitted by the defendants were used to induce the Fund's stockholders
to forego the exercise of their statutory absolute privilege to terminate the investment advisory contract at any time; in brief, that the Fund became a
mere adjunct of the Management Company through the defendants' gross
misconduct and gross abuse of trust.
Ballock is an opportune case for finding a private right of action
under the Investment Company Act because defendants are charged

with violation of eight different secton of the act. The Court tabulated
them thus :27 section iS (a) (3), relating to unlawful investment advisory
service; section 17(h) and (i) on invalidity of exculpatory dauses to
protect officers ancd-directors;' section _o(a) and various SEC rules on
proxy solidtation; section 3 4(b) on untrue statements in certain documents; section 36 on gross misconduct and gross abuse of trust; section
a._n larceny, embezzlement, and willful conversion; section 44 on
D7 -oninjurisdiction of suits at law and in equity; 2 s and section

validity of contracts violating the act. Defendants could not strictly be
26Id. at p. 93,362. As to the alleged wrongful transactions concerning the investment advisory and underwriting contracts and their extensions, the complaint alleges
that "the relative positions of the defendants in such transactions were as follows:
Bullock, Clark and the Management Company 'caused' the transactions. The other
eight defendants 'participated or acquiesced in' such transactions 'with knowledge or
notice
27 of their wrongful character.' " Id. at pp. 93,356, 932358.
1d. at pp. 93,359-60.
"Although § 44. is central to this case, a close reading of the section does not

indicate any sense in which defendants could have violated it. The court was apparently
overzealous in its tabulation of alleged offenses.
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said to have violated some of these sections, however, unless the act implicitly establishes fiduciary standards.
The relief sought by the plaintiffs is that the investment advisory
and underwriting contracts and their extensions be declared null and
void, that the Management Company and individual defendants be
required "to repay the investment advisory fees to the Fund" and "to
account to the Fund and its shareholders for profits and damages," and
that plaintiffs recover the costs and expenses of bringing suit. 9
Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter and for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. 30 Before ruling on defendants' motion, the dis31
strict court cogently framed the dispositive issues:
I Whether the statutory provisions upon which the plaintiffs' claims is
based created any duties owing by the defendants to the Fund or to the plaintiffs.
II Whether the defendants' acts as alleged in the complaint violated any
of those duties.
III Whether the plaintiffs can bring this action in this court to enforce the
liabilities and duties created by this act.
Its remarks prefatory to deciding further indicate the spirit in which
32
this court approached its task:
These issues pose a problem of statutory interpretation requiring a view in
depth. It is interpretation of the various statutory provisions-not fragmented
into isolated sections nor subjected to mere black-letter reasoning-as integrated parts of a remedial enactment possessing a fundamental unity of
specific policy and stated objectives.
Although the Brouk decision in the Eighth Circuit was urged upon
it, the court expressed its "respectful disagreement with the views expressed . . . to the extent that they restrictively interpret the 194o
Act," and denied the motion to dismiss.3 In view of the similarity of
alleged misconduct by defendants in Brouk and Bullock, the diametrical
holdings of the two cases leave some doubt as to the existence and extent
of private remedy under the Investment Company Act 4
o CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,013 at p. 93)359Motion pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (i) and (6).
8 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,013 at p. 93,36o.
82 Ibid.
"Id. at p. 9 3 , 3 85. An interlocutory appeal is now pending.
", The superficial distinction which the Bullock court makes, at pp. 93,384-85 of
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,013, is not at all satisfactory. It relies on some un-
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Whenever a case arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States, jurisdiction is vested in the district courts by the
"federal question" statute, 5 provided the amount in controversy is
greater than ten thousand dollars. Although plaintiffs in both Brouk
and Bullock contended that a federal question was presented, they relied
on the more specific wording of section 44 of the Investment Company
0
Act:"
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of violations
of this title or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, and concurrently
with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation
of, this title or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder.
This section is quite similar to the jurisdictional clauses in the Securities
Act of 1933," the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,"8 and
the Trust Indenture Act of 1939.3' Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of i934 is identical, except that it vests exclusive jurisdiction
in United States courts to enforce liabilities and duties created by the
1934 Act.4" The term violations, as used in these statutes, encompasses
civil litigation as well as criminal cases. 4 ' In Bullock the district court
adopted the SEC's interpretation of section 44,thus:4
fortunate language in the Brouk opinion to the effect that directors are not liable as
insurers. 286 F.zd at 918. The Managed Funds complaint charged that "the defendants committed, or with actual or constructive knowledge . . . aided, abetted,
acquiesced in or condoned, directly or indirectly, violations of the Investment Company
Act of 1940." 286 F.2d at 903. To say that this complaint seeks to hold defendants
liable as insurers is merely to restate the Brouk court's conclusion that the act of itself
establishes no implicit fiduciary obligations.
" 28 U.S.C. § 133 1 (1958).
36 54 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 8oa-43 (-958).
8T 48 Stat. 86 (1933), as amended, 1 U.S.C. § 77V (1958).
5
8s49 Stat. 835 (1935), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 79Y (x958).
so53 Stat. 1175 (1939), 15 U.s.C. § 77vvv(b) (1958).
4048 Stat. 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1958).
41

Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. x949); Grossman v. Young, 70

F. Supp. 970 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).

'aCCH FED. SEc. L.REP. 91,013 at p. 93,384. See Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission Amicus Curiae filed with the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York, in the case of Brown v. Bullock, p. 3;
Motion of Securities and Exchange Commission for Leave to Participate Amicus Curiae,
filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the case of
Brouk v. Managed Funds, p. 4.
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Since the Commission can bring only equity suits and only in the federal courts

[sections 3 5 (d), 36 and 42 (e)], the other elements in section 44 must refer
to appropriate private actions and suits, in the proper federal or state court to
enforce any liability created by the Act.
Standing alone section 44 appears to envision private actions. However,
inasmuch as the draftsmen of the I94O Act copied this jurisdictional
clause from cognate sections of previously enacted federal securities
statutes, there may be a surplusage of jurisdictional power in this clause
so far as the Investment Company Act alone is concerned. But even in
the absence of section 44, federal jurisdiction for a private action might
be sustained by implication.
Once plaintiffs have established a federal claim, then under the
principle of pendent jurisdiction the court is also empowered to decide
any common law claims involved in their action if the same proof will
sustain both the federal and nonfederal claims.43 However, the federal
claim must be substantial and not "'a mere excrescence or superfluity
tacked onto' a non-federal claim.""
In order to save a civil liability- complaint against dismissal, the
plaintiff must do more than justify the federal jurisdiction; he must
state a claim on which relief can be granted.4 5 Compliance with this
latter requirement is relatively easy when a federal statute expressly
provides for the appropriate civil liability. Under the Investment
Company Act, however, express civil liability provisions are quite
limited in scope and, indeed, are so miniscule that the Broak court overlooked their existence. 46 Consequently, plaintiffs in this type of case
"3Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (933)

i Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.zd 195 (2d Cir.

v. Scheinman, 139 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943).
" CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 91,013 at p. 93,373, where the court is quoting from
Howard v. Furst, 238 F.zd 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1956).
"Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), discusses the technical difference between
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
"' Section 2 9 (f) of the act incorporates by reference the civil liability provision in
§ 16 of the Securities Exchange Act with regard to recovery of insiders' short-swing
trading profits. Section 29 (f) is, however, applicable only to directors and other
afliliates of closed-end investment companies. The SEC contends that § 24(e)(3) provides for civil liability of directors in connection with registration statements filed under
the Securities Act. See Motion of Securities and Exchange Commission for Leave to
Participate Amicus Curiae, filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Brouk v. Managed Funds, pp. 4-5, n. 5. This contention appears to be
erroneous upon close reading of the statute. Section 24(e) (3) merely provides for
certain operative facts relating to a liability which arises under the Securities Act. The
Commission further urges that §§ 17 (h) and 38(c) contemplate civil liability under
the 194o act. This is questionable, however.
1959) 5 Zalkind
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must usually proceed on the theory that the act establishes certain
standards of conduct whose breach is civilly actionable by implication.
The Brouk and Bullock decisions evince a fundamental conflict as
to whether the Investment Company Act creates fiduciary standards.
The Court of Appeals in Brouk recognized that conduct on the part
of directors or other affiliates of investment companies that violates the
act will invoke the criminal and administrative sanctions set forth in the
various sections of the act. But the court rejected- the notion that
these statutory proscriptions embrace a standard of fiduciary care whose
breach would be civilly actionable by injured parties. The SEC, on the
other hand, has suggested that at least eleven sections of the act codify
or expand the common law duties of directors of investment comThe district court in Bullock generally adopted plaintiffs'
panies.
position "that specific sections of the Act impose specific duties
upon the directors, investment advisers and principal underwriters of
registered companies; and that section 44 grants federal jurisdiction if
violations of these specific statutory duties are alleged. 48 But, in
addition to fiduciary duties implied from the "thou shalt not" clauses,
the Bullock court also determined that the various grants of power in
the act necessarily carry with them "the imposition of corresponding
fiduciary obligations." 40 Whether the act imposes fiduciary duties is
"'These are § xo, regulating composition of the board of directors, § Is(c), nullifying the vote of directors in certain instancesi ,§ xT(a), prohibiting sales transactions
between directors and their investment companies, and also prohibiting loans to
directors; § 17 (d), prohibiting joint participations by directors with their investment
companies; 117(e), restricting directors' actions as agents or brokers for their investment companies; § 17 (h), banning exculpatory clauses to relieve directors of liability
for various sorts of misfeasance including reckless disregard of duties; § 25(c), relating
to injunctions against certain plans of reorganization; § 32(a) (1), disqualifying certain
directors to vote in the selection of an accountant; § 2 9 (f), relating to recovery of
short-swing trading profits from directors; § 37, creating a federal offense in cases of
larceny or embezzlement by directorsi and § 36, relating to injunctions against directors
guilty of gross misconduct. See Motion of Securities and Exchange Commission for
Leave to Participate Amicus Curiae, filed with the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit in Brouk v. Managed Funds, pp. 5-10.
4 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,013 at p. 93,363.
9
I at p. 93,3751d.
"The grant of these defined powers, as specified by the Act, carries with it the
imposition of corresponding duties. The power to extend the investment advisory contract necessarily carries with it the duty to determine whether or not the extension is
desirable and in the best interest of the company. The power to terminate the investment
advisory contract necessarily carries with it the duty to keep alert for reasons which
might make termination necessary or desirable . . . . The objectives of the Act would
be nullified if the directors were free to extend mechanically the contract without
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ultimately a question of congressional intent. However, some courts
hold that the existence of private rights of action under a statute is not
dependent on any affirmative indications that they were intended: "On
the contrary, they are implied unless the legislation evidences a contrary intention."50
Professor Loss discusses the theoretical51 bases for implied liability
under the federal securities statutes thusly:
honestly exercising-their best judgment. The objectives of the Act would be equally
frustrated if the directors were free to close their eyes to any developments making the
termination of the contract advisable.
By giving the directors the right to extend and to terminate the contract, the Act
necessarily also imposes upon the directors the fiduciary duty to use these powers intelligently, diligently and solely for the interests of the company and its stockholders.
These specific fiduciary duties are created by the Act. Their violations subjects the
directors to liability, which can be enforced in the federal courts under section 44 of the
Act." Ibid.
'o CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 91,013 at p. 93,366. Accord, Taussig v. Wellington
Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179, 217 (D. Del. 196o ) ; Narramore v. Cleveland, C.C. &
St. L. R.R., 96 Fed. 298, 3oo (6th Cir. x899). Contra, Brouk v. Managed Funds,
Inc., 286 F.zd 9oi, 912 (8th Cir. 196i).
The common-law tort basis
"Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1043-45 (1951).
of which Loss speaks has been written into the Restatement, as follows:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act or by failing to do
a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other
as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect; and
(c) where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard, the
invasion of the interest results from that hazard; and
(d) the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted
himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286
(1934-).
See generally Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV.
L. REv. 453 (933); Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16
MINN. L. REV. 361 (1932); Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 317 (1914).
See also Note, FederalJurisdiction in Suits for Damages under
o
PROSSER,
(x948).
Statutes not Affording Such Remedy, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1o9
ToRTs 265 (1941) takes an unenthusiastic view of such implied rights of action: "In
the ordinary case . . . the obvious conclusion is that the legislature either did not have
the civil action in mind at all, or deliberately omitted to provide for it."
Because of the distinction between a common law tort action grounded on breach of
a federal statute (which is taken as a standard of prudence and care for the purpose
of showing negligence), which theoretically requires diversity of citizenship to get into
federal court, and an action based on a liability created by the statute itself, there is much
discussion in Brouk and other cases as to whether the alleged liability and duty are
creatures of the statute or whether they are merely indicia of common law negligence.
Loss suggests, however, that courts have not questioned the federal jurisdiction once
they decided that there was an implied right of action. Loss, op. cit. supra at io5i-5z
and Supp. (1955) at 369, n. 375.
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One is the

provision [s] . . . to the effect that every contract made in violation of the

statute or any rule thereunder, as well as every contract whose performance
will involVe such a violation, shall be "void" . . . . [This type of provision]
can apply, of course, only where plaintiff and defendant are in privity of contract-or perhaps where the plaintiff can work out a third-party beneficiary
relationship.
The other basis of the implied liabilities is the common-law tort doctrine
of private action based on violation of a statute. There is much jurisprudential
talk about the kind of statute which makes this doctrine operable. In general,
so it is said, the interest invaded must be one which the enactment is intended
to protect; where the enactment is designed exclusively to protect the interests
of the state or the public as a whole, violation results in no civil liability.
It is all a matter of "legislative intention." The courts have to be sure they
are only "finding" and not "making" the law.
The implication of a private right of action under federal securities
laws developed first and has flourished most under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in particular under section io(b) and Rule X-IoB-5
promulgated thereunder. 52 The availability of a civil remedy under

section io(b) was first discussed in Kardon v.National Gypsum Co."3
In that case the court, relying on the Restatement of Torts, found
disregard of a statutory command to be tortious. In the absence of a
dear indication that Congress intended to withhold from injured
parties the right to recover damages caused by the statutory violation,
the court upheld the private right of action. Emphasizing the purpose
of the statute, the Kardon court concluded that the mere omission of
civil liability provisions was not sufficient to negate the common law
implication of a private right of action.
The Kardon opinion also suggested that relief could be founded
on section 29(b) of the 1934 act, the statutory voiding provision which
"almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it."'54 This void
contract theory of implied liability was more fully developed in
"See

Annot., 37 A.L.R.zd 649 (195.1), Civil Action by Private Person under
x934; Note, 1961 DUKE L.J. 330. 4 STAN. L.
REV. 308 (195z) argues that privity of contract is not required for a cause of action
under § io(b) and Rule X-ioB-5. Contra, Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Tel. Corp.,
99 F. Supp. 70, (S.D.N.Y. x95i), aff'd, 198 F.ld 883 (zd Cir. 1952).
"69 F. Supp. 5x2 (E.D. Pa. 1946), 73 F. Supp. 798, opinion amended, 83 F.
Supp. 613 (947). For discussion of the case, see Latty, The Aggrieved Buyer or
Seller or Holder of Shares under the S.E.C. Statutes, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 505

§ zo(b) of Securities Exchange Act of

(z953)"t 37 A.L.R.zd 649, 651 (1954).
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Goldstein v. Groesbeck,5 5 a stockholders' derivative suit to recover
moneys paid under a service contract that was illegal and void under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, utilizing the void contract theory, held ihat the complaint was good against a motion to dismiss. 6
In 1958, the District Court for the Southern District of New York
considered a private action brought under section 7 of the Investment
Company Act, which makes unlawful certain transactions by unregistered
W57 was both a derivative and
investment companies. Cogan v. Johnston
a representative action. The complaint charged the defendant directors
with conspiracy to circumvent the i94o Act and "to freeze out the
public stockholders by transactions in violation of the Act," with causing
the company "to violate the Act for their own interests," and with
"gross abuse of trust as corporate officers and directors." ' Jurisdiction
was based on section 44 of the act and also on section 36, which
authorizes the Commission to seek an injunction against gross abuse of
trust by directors, officers, and other affiliates. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and also the appointment of a receiver to insure that
the company complied with the i94o Act. In denying a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the court indicated that individuals could bring private actions in federal courts to
enforce liabilities and to enjoin violations under the act. Although the
court approved implication of jurisdiction for private actions from
section 36, in this particular case such jurisdiction did not attach because
S142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944).
16

In discussing the Public Utility Holding Company Act, the court said:

CAs we have seen the Act makes it unlawful for unregistered holding companies to enter

'directly or indirectly' into service or construction contracts .... Violation being thus
established, §26(b) . . .in express terms declares the contracts void. It should follow
that the operating companies are entitled to a refund, for no other result can fulfill the
expressed purpose of the Act of protecting subsidiaries from the overreachings of holding
companies. Thus, the statutory declaration of the necesssity for control of holding
companies . . . states, inter alia, that the national public interest is adversely affected

when subsidiary public utility companies are subjected to excessive charges for services.
The three specific sanctions stated in the Act-injunction .

. .,

criminal punishment....

and the negative relief of . . .declaring the contracts void-do not in terms place the
defrauded operating company in statu quo; and § 26 [the contract voiding provision] is
incomplete, if not ineffective, unless it is considered to authorize recovery by operating
companies .... [W]e think a denial of a private right of action to those for whose

ultimate protection the legislation is intended leaves legislation highly publicized as in
the public interest in fact sadly wanting, and even delusive to that end." X42 F.2d at)
4z6-27.
ST

s6z F. Supp. 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

geId. at 908.
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the investment company involved was an unregistered company, and
section 36 pertains only to registered companies.
In a more recent case, Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc.,"' a district
court approved private actions under section 36 of the act. This approval
was actually dictum, since relief was granted on common-law grounds,
but the court said:"'
Violation of a federal statute may accord a private litigant a remedy by
implication notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory authority conferring upon the injured the right to redress statutory wrongs, for the common
law will supply a remedy where the statute is silent....
The intention to create civil liability is presumed unless a contrary legislative intent is to be inferred from the whole purview of the Act ....
It is one thing to say that the three [SEC] statutes in question were
drafted with the overall intent to protect the investing public but something
quite different to conclude a competitor has no standing to prosecute a violation of these enactments.
Private rights of action in tort law are commonly implied from penal
statutes. Accordingly, the district court in Bullock showed no hesitation
in implying a right of action under section 37, which deals with larceny
and embezzlement from registered investment companies. But section
36, the gross abuse of trust section, provides only an administrative
remedy to terminate misconduct by officials of registered investment companiesi it imposes no penal sanction at all. The Bullock court noted
this absence of criminal sanction in the section, but relied on a pronouncement of the Supreme Court:6
59 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 196o).
60
Id. at z17, 219.
This court takes an even broader view of implied rights of action than does § 286
of the Restatement of Torts, quoted at note 51 supra. The court says (by way of dictum) :
"In the present context, federal statutory remedies accorded by implication must be
held to extend to persons other than the investing public in certain compelling instances.
To begin with, in particular circumstances the investors' interest is peculiarly served by
according remedial rights by implication to persons other than investors. The administrative agency exercising appropriate discretion may decide not to institute the required
action to protect the injured litigants' interests. Further, there may be no remedy
conferred by State law, or in the case of an enterprise engaged in multi-state activities,
local relief may be entirely inadequate. The crux of the matter is, plaintiffs are not
acting as private attorneys general, or as a special representative of the Commission.
Plaintiffs are in Court in an attempt to vindicate the rights and protections which they
claim are secured to [the investment company] by virtue of federal law." Id. at 219.
"1 Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S. Clerks, 281 U.s. 548, 569
(1930).
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The absence of a penalty is not controlling. The creation of a legal right
by language suitable to that end does not require for its effectiveness the
imposition of statutory penalties. Many rights are enforced for which no
statutory penalties are provided.
Historically, the Investment Company Act was written only after
an extensive study by the SEC had unveiled a multitude of abuses in
management of investment companies, and then the industry itself cooperated with the Commission in drafting a bill. The various congressional reports6 2 on the investment company bills do not discuss implied private rights of action. The Brouk decision suggests, however,
that the well-nigh unanimous support which the industry accorded the
final bill would not have been forthcoming if Congress had envisioned
such private rights of action. However, the legislative history is inconclusive on this point. "3
In determining whether Congress meant to control or regulate or
expand the common law duties of investment company directors and, in
general, whether Congress intended to provide private remedies under
the Investment Company Act, the Court of Appeals in Brouk utilized
the maxim expressio unius est exciusio alterius. The court erroneously
assumed that the act contains no express civil liability provision,"4 and
then applied this maxim on an inter-statutory basis to negate the plaintiffs' claim of implied civil liability."5 The expressio unius argument
more frequently arises upon intra-statutory construction. However, it
has been specifically rejected by the Second Circuit in a case under the
Securities Exchange Act" and by the Supreme Court in a case under the
Securities Act." The Supreme Court promulgated instead the doctrine
that "courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and
will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits
so as to carry out in particular cases the generally expressed legislative
policy ...."s
"The congressional records are listed by the Bullock court at pp. 93,36o-61 of
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 7 91,013.
"8For discussion of the legislative history, see Jaretzki, The Investment Company
4ct of x940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (194.)

Under the Investment Company 4ct of
",See note 46 supra.

5 Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct

1940,

28 Gao. WASH.

L.

REV. 266

0959)-

"'Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 9o, 912 (8th Cir. 1961).
"Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
o,
8 SEC v. Joiner Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1953).
Id. at 350-5 .
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The Bullock court based its interpretation of the Investment Company Act on what it considered to be the dominating general purpose of
the act: 69
The 1940 Act, regulating in depth a particular industry, is much more comprehensive in thrust and scope than the 1934 Act. In certain major respects,
the 194o Act operates as a corporation law for investment companies. In
sharp contrast, the 1934 Act (like the 1933 Act) regulates one phase,-the
purchase and sale of corporate securities. The distinction is between commodity regulation and industry regulation. The protective reach of the
latter extends to the corporation as well as the stockholder and the public
generally.
In light of the distinctive character of investment companies and their
easy susceptibility to management abuses (e.g., looting of the companies by
insiders' using means both crude and subtle), one of the primary objectives
of the 194o Act was the protection of investment companies as well as investors against the derelictions of investment companies' directors, investment
advisers, other fiduciaries, and principal underwriters. To say that the 1940
Act was not intended in part to protect investment companies is to emasculate
the statute.

Unlike prior federal securities legislation, the Investment Company
Act sets forth its purpose elaborately; in section 17° it declares:
the national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected
. . . when investment companies are organized, operated, managed, or their
portfolio securities are selected, in the interest of directors, officers, investment
advisers, depositors, or other affiliated persons thereof in the interest of underwriters, brokers, or dealers . . . rather than in the interest of all classes of
such companies' security holders; . . . when investment companies are managed by irresponsible persons ....

Section i also includes a "congressionally promulgated canon" of construction:
It is declared that the policy and purposes of this chapter, in accordance
with which the provisions of this chapter shall be interpreted, are to mitigate
" CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 91,013 at p. 93,373. The court further stated that "the
Act, through numerous specific provisions, created an entire pattern of prescriptions
and prohibitions with respect to the organization of investment companies, the composiS94o

tion of their boards of 'directors, voting rights, the terms and conditions of contracts
entered into by investment companies and their investment advisers and managers and

principal underwriters. Manifestly, the overall policy, objectives and mechanism of the
1934. Act and the x94o Act are widely different." Ibid.
"0The First Circuit has alluded to this section of the act as codifying "the fiduciary
obligations placed upon officers and directors of investment companies." Aldred Inv.
Trust v. SEC, 15i F.2d 254, 76o (st Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (x946).
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and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the conditions enumerated in this section
which adversely affect the national interest of investors.

The Brouk and Bullock courts, after searching out congressional
intention underlying the Investment Company Act, came to antithetical
views. The superficial factual distinctions in the two cases 71 do not
adequately reconcile their diverse approaches to statutory construction.
Inasmuch as the federal judiciary has traditionally taken a liberal view
of its jurisdictional powers in securities regulation, the Bullock philosophy seems more likely to prevail. The implied right of action under the
Investment Company Act, if recognized, will surely assume major
importance in the regulation of investment companies.
" See note 34 supra.

